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The Kyrgyz Republic joined the WTO twenty years ago with the expectation that structural 
reforms required for obtaining membership and the application of trade rules would 
facilitate its transformation from a centrally planned to a market economy and ease its 
integration into the WTO multilateral trading system. It completed its accession process 
in record time, liberalized its economy considerably, reduced tariffs significantly, and made 
substantial commitments in a broad range of services sectors. It adopted legislation in all 
areas required for WTO membership and created competitive market access conditions for 
goods and services. Looking back at two decades of WTO membership, there is evidenced 
that the reform process is paying off. Trade has expanded significantly and new markets have 
been tapped for imports and exports, thus decreasing its dependency on traditional trading 
partners. As a result, the economy has grown rapidly. At the same time, many challenges 
remain to further diversify the economy, take better advantage of opportunities offered in 
the services trade, attract foreign direct investment, and fully implement all WTO related 
laws, rules, and regulations. The reform process continues to be essential to Kyrgyzstan’s 
economic policies to deepen and solidify its integration into the world trading system.
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Introduction
The Kyrgyz Republic was the first Central Asian country to join the WTO in 1998, 
after gaining its independence in 1991. It applied for WTO membership in 1996 and com-
pleted the accession process in a record time of 2 years and 10 months, compared to an 
average time of nine and a half years needed for most WTO accession negotiations in the 
past 20 years. As WTO DG Azevêdo stated in a recorded message to the participants to 
a conference organized at the occasion of the celebration of twenty years of WTO mem-
bership: “The Kyrgyz Republic is the pioneer among Central Asian countries and former 
USSR Republics to take this important step to integrate in the global trading system’, fur-
ther adding that… Kyrgyz Republic holds the record of the fastest accession negotiations 
in the WTO and that’s good, you did it in just two and a half years — in the world of 
diplomacy that’s light speed”1. 
This achievement is even more remarkable given the complexity of the process of 
obtaining Membership of the WTO and which implies many challenges for the countries 
wanting to join. It requires major structural reforms and changes in legislation and trade 
policies and practices. The government was determined to pursue Membership fast and 
conduct the necessary economic and legislative reforms and proceed with the transition 
from a centrally planned economy to a market-based economy speedily, thus unlocking 
the significant new opportunities that WTO membership was expected to create. 
The accession process required a fundamental rethinking of Kyrgyzstan’s economic 
and trade policies, the creation of new institutions designed to implement the policies and 
major trade capacity building efforts at the technical level to better understand the rights 
and obligations of WTO membership. Given that the WTO is a system of rights and ob-
ligations and that Member’s trade policies and practices can legally be challenged, it was 
important for the Kyrgyz authorities to get it right from the beginning. This meant that 
it needed to adopt legislation and trade policy measures that would secure the degree of 
market openness acceptable to the membership and at the same time provide leverage to 
protect segments in the economy that were not ready to face external competition. 
The Kyrgyz Republic, after twenty years of membership is on the wake of undergoing 
its third trade policy review in 2020, thus providing a good opportunity to take stock of the 
accomplishments of twenty years of WTO membership and review the reforms undertaken 
and the key challenges that the Kyrgyz Republic is still facing. This paper will take a closer 
look at how the reform process was performed and how Kyrgyzstan benefited from it. It 
will be argued that the domestic reforms undertaken in order to obtain WTO membership 
have generated tremendous economic opportunities to the Kyrgyz Republic, with significant 
growth in exports and imports both in goods and services. At the same time, the Kyrgyz 
1 Conference held in Bishkek on 20 December 2018 and was preceded by an academic event organized 
at the International University of the Kyrgyz Republic in September 2018 with presentations made by the 
authors of this paper. URL: https://youtu.be/lToCW0m8iLE (accessed: 20.12.2018).
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Republic continues to face major challenges integrating more fully in the world economy, 
diversifying its production, reducing its dependency on primary products, raw materials, 
minerals, including precious metals and being part of the Global Value Chain. The research 
is largely based on a review of literature and analysis of official economic data and statistics.
In the paper the authors want to test the hypothesis that accession to the WTO re-
quires fundamental structural reforms resulting in a fuller integration into the multilateral 
trading system and new trade opportunities. In doing so, the paper is structured as fol-
lows: it will first address the domestic reforms required for obtaining WTO membership 
and include a review of recent literature on accessions and economic reforms. This will 
be followed by a brief discussion of the conditions that apply to Kyrgyzstan’s accession to 
the WTO. It will be shown that by any standards, Kyrgyzstan has liberalized its economy 
significantly and which provided the basis for obtaining the economic benefits associated 
with accession. Evidence to that effect will be offered in a subsequent section, discussing 
the economic performance of the Kyrgyz Republic after it became a member. It will be 
argued that the economy expanded very rapidly, but challenges remain in terms of eco-
nomic and trade diversification. Also, it will be argued that while Kyrgyzstan is rapidly 
integrating into the WTO multilateral trading system, it is in parallel pursuing the avenue 
of regional integration, including with some of its traditional trading partners. The ques-
tion of the legal implications for its WTO commitments will be addressed, as a significant 
number of tariff lines will need to be renegotiated. The one but last section of the paper 
will look at the future of Kyrgyzstan’s trade policies and the main challenges it is currently 
facing in view of its membership and legal commitments. It will be argued that there is 
still a significant job to be done, which require further and deeper reforms in several spe-
cific areas. The final section offers some of the main conclusions and which confirm the 
hypothesis that reforms lead to trade expansion. Kyrgyzstan is much better integrated in 
the MTS then it was at the time of accession. Concrete and measurable economic benefits 
were generated, leading to a rapid expansion of its economy and trade. 
1. How WTO Membership Supports Domestic Reforms?
While WTO membership offers many advantages, one of the key motivations that 
pushed most formerly centrally planned economies to apply for membership are the 
underlying structural reforms to be conducted. This certainly was an important driving 
force for Kyrgyz Republic which applied in 1996, shortly after gaining independence, and 
launched a drastic reform process. It completed the accession process in a record time, 
less than 3 years with many of the reforms still on-going today. In 2009, in an interview 
with the country’s chief negotiator with the WTO, former Deputy Prime Minister of Kyr-
gyzstan, E. Omuraliev, reiterated the main reasons for the country’s accession to the WTO: 
“This was a necessary step that was made in a timely manner and for the good of the coun-
try. Through membership in the WTO, Kyrgyzstan received a completely new model of 
economic development and a legal framework that meets international standards, which 
became the basis for taking the economy out of the deep crisis caused by the collapse of 
the USSR and the global financial crisis of 1998” [ICTSD, 2009]2. 
2 Filipova T. (2009) ICTSD, Kyrgyzstan and the WTO: Summing Up the Decade. 23 February. URL: 
https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/мосты/news/кыргызстан-и-вто-подводя-итоги-десятилетия 
(accessed: 05.05.2019).
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Kyrgyzstan has benefited significantly from WTO membership, but it still has a long 
way to go to insert itself more fully into the trading system and reap all the benefits WTO 
membership has to offer [Sutyrin, Koval, Trofimenko, 2014]. In many ways the reform 
process is a never-ending process. Reforms are necessary to stay ahead of the game, a sine 
qua non for creating a more appropriate and favorable business environment, conducive 
to trade, as is underscored by the official statements made by recently acceded members 
[Smeets, 2017]3. According to the WTO’s annual report (2016) by the Director-General, 
out of a total of 36 Article XII members4, 18 of them, i.e. half, specifically indicated in 
their introductory statements in the working party reports that the transition from central 
planning to market economy was an explicit objective5. Furthermore, and according to 
the WTO “since the accession agreements, or ’protocols’, are international treaty obligations, 
they have a wide-ranging effect both on the multilateral trading system and on the national 
economies that have undertaken the reforms. This means that accession negotiations can 
prove an important instrument, not only for updating multilateral trade rules, but for helping 
acceding governments to undertake needed domestic reforms”6.
Bacchetta and Drabek note that “the third reason is the beneficial effect of the mem-
bership on domestic policies and institutions involved in the conduct of international 
trade. Acceding countries are required to put in place a set of norms and institutions, 
which support the liberalization of markets and increase transparency and promote the 
rule of law, contract enforcement and the evolution of an independent judicial system. 
In principle, nothing would prevent government from putting in place these norms and 
regulations on a unilateral basis. The role of the WTO in this process is to facilitate the in-
troduction of effective reforms not only by reinforcing the credibility of the government’s 
trade policies but also help introduce the policies that are based on best-practices and that 
must be harmonized ” [Bacchetta, Drabek, 2002].
Separately, following the independence of the CIS countries and Baltic states, there 
was a strong push from the side of some major international institutions and more specifi-
cally by the OECD, the IMF, World Bank and the EBRD for these countries to engage in 
the structural and economic reform process, accompanied by specific advice on how to 
conduct the reforms7. The WTO, too, played a key role in consolidating the reforms as it 
was felt that the WTO membership would anchor the transition to market-based regimes. 
The recognition that the WTO is the only international organization governing trade with 
multilateral trade rules was a decisive factor in joining this organization. 
In addition to the expected material benefits that trade liberalization would offer, 
it was increasingly well understood that the cost of staying out of the WTO is too high, 
certainly at a time with a rapidly growing economic interdependency between nations. 
One key advantage of membership is the automatic application of the two fundamental 
3 See also: WTO Accessions 2017, Annual Report by the Director-General (WT/ACC/31, WT/GC/189, 
WT/MIN(17)6. 29 November 2017. Tables 3 and 4. 7. URL: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/
dgreport_2017_e.pdf (accessed: 07.05.2019).
4 Article XII members are the newly acceded members under Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
URL: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm articleXII (accessed: 07.05.2019).
5 WTO Accessions: 2016 Annual report. 2 December 2016 (WT/ACC/28). Table 1, p. 17. URL: https://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/dgreport_2016_e.pdf (accessed: 07.05.2019).
6 The WTO at Twenty, Challenges and Achievements. WTO Geneva. October 2015, p.  22. URL: 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/wto_at_twenty_e.pdf (accessed: 09.06.2019). 
7 Sometimes the financial support to accompany the reform was made conditional upon the reforms.
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non-discriminatory treatment measures of the WTO: Most Favoured Nation (MFN) and 
national treatment in terms of access conditions to other markets8. These principles create 
security, stability, predictability and certainty in trade which are key factor for business 
transactions and allowing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the country and are criti-
cal in the decision-making process to join. 
Importantly, the WTO is a rules-based system where the rule of law applies. While 
the benefits from WTO accession are often associated with the new market access op-
portunities offered, the real gains are obtained through the domestic structural reforms 
conducted in order to align domestic policies with international norms and standards. It is 
well recognized that there is a price to pay for the acceding country, as the accession leads 
to economic costs resulting from market adjustments following changes in relative prices 
of goods and services in the domestic market. 
The reform agenda requires institutional change and the creation of new facilities 
in areas as SPS, TBT, customs administration, services, intellectual property rights and 
ensuring effective competition in the market, significantly adding to the cost as will be 
shown further. Hence there is a price tag attached to membership and someone needs to 
foot the bill (World Bank 2001). How to cope with these costs and how to turn the costs 
into economic advantage is the challenge faced in the reform process. This is part of the 
policy challenges of each new WTO member.
Another cost aspect is the result of market liberalization performed through tariff 
reductions and which a priori implies a loss in fiscal revenue. Lower import duties imply 
lower tax revenue, which need to be offset one way or another. In practice, this foregone 
revenue should be compensated for by efficiency gains to be obtained by higher competi-
tion in the market, lower transaction costs and the cheaper imports of parts and compo-
nents used in the manufactures of exports. This follows the logic that a tax on imports 
equals a tax on exports, hence a reduction of costs in imports improves the competitive 
conditions in the export market. The positive effects are not immediate and will mostly be 
felt over time. Hence the accession generates short-term costs with the expectation that 
these will be outweighed by the medium to longer term gains. The practice confirms that 
the positive outcome is indeed the case, as recently acceded Members have consistently 
had stronger trade growth performance than the original members. Since 1995, the aver-
age trade growth rate of Article XII members was 12.4 %, almost double that of original 
members (7.4 %), including after the financial crisis of 2008. China’s average growth rate 
for the period 1995–2013 is 16.0 %, which is exceptionally high, and it largely outperforms 
the other countries. Economic growth in Kyrgyz Republic has also been above the average, 
as will be shown later. One should nevertheless be cautious in attributing the substantially 
8 According to Article I, para. 1 of the GATT 1994, the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) Treatment 
means that “with respect to customs duties and charges of any kind… any advantage, favour, privilege or 
immunity granted by any (Member) to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be 
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories 
of all other Members”. See also [Van den Bossche, Zdouc, 2017] for further reading (p. 311–340). National 
treatment is covered under Article III of the GATT 1994, which contains specific provisions prohibiting 
discrimination in the treatment of any product, domestic or imported, once it has entered the market. Para. 
4 states that: “The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other 
contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of 
national origin in respect of laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, 
purchase, transport, distribution or use…” For further reading, see also [Van den Bossche, Zdouc, 2017, 
p. 341–399]. 
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higher growth rates exclusively to the WTO accession, as there are not only numerous 
other macro-economic factors that contribute to growth, but equally many developments 
in the world economy play an important role, often unrelated to WTO accession.
The reform process thus is of critical importance and at the same time very challeng-
ing, as the inefficiencies of the domestic markets in the transition economies could and 
probably will lead to a surge in imports competing with domestic goods of sometimes 
lower quality and foreign direct investment with the risk of depressing the domestic econ-
omy at first. How will the market adjust to those challenges, lay-offs and market restruc-
turing and what accompanying or flanking policies can be put in place by the authorities? 
How rendering the economy more efficient, facilitating a better integration into world 
markets, producing and selling higher quality of goods at competitive prices and gener-
ating a larger consumer choice? Those are the key questions. Like most other acceding 
countries, as shown further, Kyrgyzstan experienced initially an economic decline in the 
first years following its accession, before the positive effects kicked in. 
The challenge was making the right policy choices for the country. A related question at 
the time was whether the reforms should be undertaken rapidly or follow a gradual process. 
Schools of thought differ widely and so did the approaches adopted by formerly centrally 
planned economies that acceded to the WTO. Some decided to ’bite the bullet’ and move 
fast, in order to quickly introduce the market-based principles, even if this meant a loss in 
GDP in the early stages of the transition process, as was the case in Kyrgyzstan. Others de-
cided to opt for a gradual transition process, taking more time to introduce the new laws and 
regulations to conform to the market-based principles. Which process is better remains an 
open question, but the facts and figures confirm that those countries that took the necessary 
actions managed to experience a steady growth in their economies. 
2. WTO Membership and Kyrgyzstan’s Commitments
As the case of Kyrgyzstan confirms, membership can be obtained fast and is largely 
determined by the determination of the acceding country. For a country or a territory to 
obtain WTO membership, the first condition is to submit a specific written expression of 
interest for membership by the country or territory to the Secretariat9. WTO member-
ship thus is entirely based on the express desire of a country to join and hence a voluntary 
process. Since the WTO was created in 1995, a total of some 36 countries successfully 
completed the accession process as Article XII members. It takes an average of 10 years 
and 2 months to complete, compared to the Kyrgyz accession in less than 3 years10. 
The process of Kyrgyz Republic accession was officially launched following the ap-
plication for WTO membership on 13  February 1996. On 16  April 1996, the General 
Council established a working party to examine the application under Article XII under 
the chairmanship of Mr Metzger (France), which included a total of 15 WTO Members, 
counting the EU as one. The terms of reference established were: “To examine the applica-
9 According to the Marrakesh Agreement Art XII(1) membership is open to any state or separate 
customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations.
10 WTO Accessions 2016: Annual Report by the Director-General’. December 2016. WT/ACC/28. 
Annex 4. URL: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/dgreport_2016_e.pdf (accessed: 20.06.2019). 
The accession of LDCs on average takes 2 years and 4 months longer than the accession of the other, non-
LDC countries.
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tion of the government of the Kyrgyz Republic to acceded to the WTO Agreement under 
Article XII, and to submit to the General Council recommendations which may include a 
draft Protocol of Accession”11. In addition to the discussions in the working party, bilateral 
market access negotiations were conducted with 12 members. 
The accession discussions and negotiations of Kyrgyzstan took place on the basis of 
a Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime of the Kyrgyz Republic, which had been 
submitted in the early phases of accession and questions relating to it12. The outcome 
of the discussions and the negotiations are contained in the Report of the Working 
Party, as well as in the Annex to the report, which contain the Kyrgyz Republic’s tariff 
schedule with reference CXLII-The Kyrgyz Republic, Part 1-Goods (WT/ACC/KGZ/26/
Add.1) and the Kyrgyz Republic’s services commitments in Part II-Services (WT/ACC/
KGZ/26/Add.2)
In the case of the former Soviet Republics, what drove them to do so, according 
to [Broadman, 2005, p. 30] was “the dismantling of the Soviet Bloc brought economic 
chaos and a collapse of trade flows, which compelled countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe to begin to reintegrate into the global economy”. The Kyrgyz Republic was the 
first of the CIS countries to kick off the process, followed by two Baltic states, Latvia and 
Estonia, who both initiated their accession process in 1993 and 1994 respectively. Their 
accessions took just over 5 years. Latvia joined the WTO in February 1999 and Estonia 
in November of the same year. Georgia, which initiated the WTO accession process in 
the same year as Kyrgyzstan (1996) became a member the WTO member on 14 June 
2000, after 4 years of negotiations. The other Baltic States, Caucasus and CIS countries 
that joined the WTO initiated their accession process as of 1993. Armenia (1993), the 
Russian Federation (1993), Lithuania (1994), and Kazakhstan (1996). Lithuania joined 
in May 2001, after 7 years of negotiations, Armenia in February 2003, nine years after 
starting the process and the Russian Federation joined in August 2012 after 19 years 
of negotiations. Kazakhstan joined in November 2015 after nearly twenty years of ac-
cession negotiations. Tajikistan applied in 2001 and joined in March 2013, thus taking 
nearly twelve years to complete the process. There are still three former republics in 
the process of accession, including Uzbekistan, which applied for Membership in 1994, 
Azerbaijan in 1997  and Belarus, for which a working party was established in 1993. 
13 All three processes are still underway. One country, Turkmenistan, has expressed 
interest but has still not applied. The two most recently acceded countries are Liberia 
and Afghanistan, who concluded their accession negotiations to the WTO in December 
11 WT/ACC/KGZ/2/ 3 May 1996 and Rev.2 18 March 1997. URL: https://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/acc_e/a1_kyrgyz_republic_e.htm (accessed: 04.07.2019).
12 Accession of Kyrgyz Republic to the WTO: Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime. 23 August 
1996. WT/ACC/KGZ/3. URL: https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009DP.aspx?language
=E&CatalogueIdList=36603,41578,10911,11148,11146&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=3&FullTextHash= (ac-
cessed: 04.07. 2019). 
13 Each accession is conducted through a working party, composed of members that have expressed an 
interest in following the debates and discussions on the terms of accession of the candidate country. Hence, the 
composition and number of countries in the working party varies from one accession to the other. The Chair-
man of the working party is appointed by the membership and in close consultation with the applicant country. 
It is also noted that in addition to the multilateral process, which is conducted through the working party, the 
applicant conducts bilateral negotiations to agree on the market access conditions, tariff schedules and services 
commitments with each of the members of the working party. Hence, in the accession process the distinction 
is made between the multilateral and the bilateral tracks, which are mostly conducted in parallel.
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2015 (MC-X, Nairobi)14 and officially joined in 2016, thus bringing the WTO member-
ship to a count of 164 members15. The membership now represents 98 % of world trade, 
thus making the system nearly universal. 
The conditions for membership are not specifically set out in legal texts of the WTO 
and are not defined. The relevant provisions in the Marrakesh Agreement (Article XII) 
simply indicate that membership can be obtained “on terms to be agreed between it and 
the WTO” which is a rather open notion and can have a different meaning for different 
countries and situations. There are no specific benchmarks and each accession is unique, 
reflecting the economic situation of the applicant and the commitments it is willing to 
make. This also explains why acceding countries are mostly required to assume higher lev-
els of obligations than the original members, often referred to as “WTO plus” provisions 
for the acceding countries. According to the WTO the newly acceded countries make con-
siderably more concessions both in the area of goods and services, with nearly 100 % of all 
tariff lines bound, mostly at lower levels and covering far more services sub-sectors16. This 
adds to the pressures of the domestic reforms, including in the regulatory area of services 
and which directly impedes in market regulation. 
A new Member thus needs to provide sufficiently convincing evidence to WTO’s 
membership that access to their markets is ensured in similar ways as the access that they 
will benefit from to world markets following accession. The logic is that a new member, by 
virtue of the MFN principle acquires in one stroke all rights and obligations that have been 
negotiated in the GATT/WTO for over 70 years, thus generating unconditional market 
access to the world markets17. The advantages and the acquired rights thus obtained need 
to be matched at the domestic level and leading to effective market access. Kyrgyzstan 
created one of the most liberal trade regimes and market access conditions and made sig-
nificant concessions in the areas of goods and services, opening its market significantly to 
competition. The Kyrgyz Republic joined the WTO with very low tariffs. As is illustrated 
in Table 1 the simple average MFN tariff is 7.8 %. For industrial products the average MFN 
duty is 6.6 %18. To compare, developed countries have an average tariff binding of less 
than 4 % for industrial goods. For agricultural products the average MFN duty is 12.1 % 
in Kyrgyzstan. To put matters further in perspective, on average, Article XII members 
have bindings for goods (all products) at 13.8 %, including 12.9 % for industrial goods and 
20.1 % for agricultural products. In other words, the Kyrgyz Republic made commitments 
at nearly half the average of other Art XII members and most of which acceded later. 
Moreover, the Kyrgyz Republic has bound 100 % of its tariff lines, thus substantially offer-
ing predictability and stability in market access conditions. Hence its efforts are significant 
by any standards.
14 World Trade Organization, Nairobi Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 19 December 2015 
(2015) WT/MIN(15)/DEC., para 18. URL: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc10_e/
nairobipackage_e.pdf (accessed: 15.06.2019). 
15 Liberia formally joined the WTO on 14 July 2016, as the WTOs 163rd Member, URL: https://www.
wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/acc_lbr_20jun16_e.htm (accessed: 10.07. 2019); followed by Afghani-
stan which formally joined the WTO on 29 July 2016 as WTO’s 164th Member. URL: https://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/countries_e/afghanistan_e.htm (accessed: 10.07.2019). 
16 World Trade Organization, WTO at Twenty: Challenges and Achievements. WTO (2015). Table 5. 
URL: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/wto_at_twenty_e.pdf (accessed: 16.07.2019).  
17 Cf footnote 8.  
18 It is recalled that the average MFN tariff for industrial products in developed countries is 3.8 %. 
Hence the Kyrgyz Republic has aligned its tariff rates very close to this average, which is a significant step.
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Table 1. Tariff structure, 2006, 2009, and 2012
 
 
MFN applied Final 
bounda2006 2009 2012
Bound tariff lines (% of all tariff lines) 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90
Simple average rate 4.90 5.10 5.00 7.80
WTO agricultural products 8.40 8.70 8.40 12.10
WTO non-agricultural products 4.10 4.10 4.10 6.60
Duty free tariff lines (% of all tariff lines) 46.10 45.50 46.40 18.90
Simple average rate of dutiable lines only 9.20 9.40 9.40 9.60
Tariff rate quotas (% of all tariff lines) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Non-ad valorem tariffs (% of all tariff lines) 1.30 1.40 1.40 1.80
Domestic tariff «peaks» (% of all tariff lines)b 2.70 1.30 1.30 0.00
International tariff «peaks» (% of all tariff lines)c 0.00 1.30 1.30 4.00
Nuisance tariffs (% of all tariff lines)d 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total number of tariff lines 11.13 10.95 10.99 10.985e
Ad valorem rates 5.84 5.82 5.73 8.71
Duty free 5.14 4.98 5.10 2.08
Specific rates 11.00 11.00 14.00 19.00
Mixed rates 139.00 143.00 145.00 181.00
Bound tariff lines (% of all tariff lines) 99.90 99.90 99.90 99.90
Simple average rate 4.90 5.10 5.00 7.80
WTO agricultural products 8.40 8.70 8.40 12.10
N o t e s: a — final bound rates are based on the 2012 tariff schedule in HS07 nomenclature;
b — domestic tariff peaks are defined as those exceeding three times the overall average applied rate;
c — international tariff peaks are defined as those exceeding 15 %;
d — nuisance rates are those greater than zero, but less than or equal to 2 %;
e — total number of bound lines (including partially bound rates); 2006 tariff is based on HS02 no-
menclature, 2009 and 2012 tariffs are based on HS07. Calculations for averages are based on national tariff 
line level (10-digit), excluding specific rates (14 tariff lines falling under alcoholic beverages) and including 
the ad valorem part of mixed rates.
B a s e d  o n: WTO Secretariat calculations. Kyrgyz WT/TPR/S/288/Rev.1  21  January 2014. Table 3.7, 
p. 35. URL: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=2ahUKEwjf14SY
3f_lAhWNlIsKHYF3D3wQFjAAegQIAxAC&url=https %3A %2F %2Fdocsonline.wto.org %2Fdol2fe %2FPag-
es %2FFE_Search %2FExportFile.aspx %3Fid %3D121920 %26filename %3Dq %2FWT %2FTPR %2FS288R1.pdf
&usg=AOvVaw2s7UdkpuV31IpHKQ3G6nMC (accessed: 03.08.2019).
Also, of significant importance is the fact that nearly 20 % of tariff lines are bound 
at duty free levels. The Kyrgyz Republic has very few tariff peaks and hardly any tariff 
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escalation19. Despite the good record, the Kyrgyz Republic faces some main challenges, 
with approximately 90 tariff lines exceeding the WTO bindings. More recently, the Kyrgyz 
Republic faces serious difficulties in its tariff schedules following its accession to various 
regional trade integration initiatives, including customs unions. De facto this implies that 
it will have to align its MFN duties with the common external tariff of the CU, represent-
ing an increase of its (low) MFN duties and thus affecting its WTO commitments. The 
implications of its regional integration will be considered further below.
In addition to its tariff liberalization, Kyrgyz Republic undertook significant services 
commitments, including in 136 services (sub) sectors. Only Moldova (147) and Ukraine 
(137) exceed that number, with all other Article XII members having made fewer com-
mitments20. This observation should be qualified, as the number of services (sub) sectors 
in itself doesn’t say much about the openness of the (sub) sector and the economic sig-
nificance of the commitments, which can only be understood by reading the commitment 
itself. Nevertheless, the number gives an indication of the policy orientations of the acced-
ing country and signals its willingness to liberalize the services trade. Services account for 
less than half of the Kyrgyz Republic’s GDP and the government intends to develop the 
services economy steadily further, as will be discussed further.
Commitments by acceding countries generally go beyond what most original mem-
bers have committed to, thus pointing at a two-speed process. In addition, most acceding 
countries have an obligation to initiate the process of joining the Government Procure-
ment Agreement (GPA) following their accession, thus expanding its membership and 
coverage. This also applies to the Kyrgyz Republic, which is an observer to the GPA and 
committed to join, as will be discussed in the next part.
The market access conditions provided are one side of the coin, as the acceding mem-
ber needs to prove that all domestic laws and regulations are in conformity with WTO law 
and ensure that all institutional arrangements are effectively in place to put its legal system 
into full operation. In Kyrgyzstan a total of 155 legislative and regulatory changes were 
introduced, as contained in the final working party report presented to and adopted by 
the General Council on 14 October 199821. This seems to be well within the average. Only 
Ukraine (449), China (2300) and Russia (1166) considerably exceeded that number22. The 
laws and regulations are scrutinized by the membership during working party meetings 
dedicated to each accession. 
This leads to another challenge, consisting of getting the full support of the law mak-
ers within the set time-frame to ratify the WTO Accession Protocol23. It can be and often 
19 Tariff escalation occurs when the tariff rates increase with the level of processing and which, thus 
reducing incentives for adding value in the production process. 
20 WT/ACC/KGZ/2/ 3 May 1996 and Rev.2 18 March 1997. URL: https://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/acc_e/a1_kyrgyz_republic_e.htm : Accession of Kyrgyz Republic to the WTO: Memorandum on 
the Foreign Trade Regime. 23 August 1996. WT/ACC/KGZ/3 (accessed: 04.07.2019).  
21 WT/ACC/KGZ/26 31 July 1998; WTO Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the 
Kyrgyz Republic. URL: https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&C
atalogueIdList=36603,41578,10911,11148,11146&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=3&FullTextHash (accessed: 
14.07.2019).
22 The WTO at twenty. Table 4, p. 25. 14 July 2019. URL: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/
wto_at_twenty_e.pdf (accessed: 05.08.2019).
23 According to Article XII the applicant member has a period of 6 months to complete the domestic 
ratification process, following completion of the accession negotiations and the adoption of the Protocol 
of Accession by the membership. This has been particularly challenging in many countries and the WTO 
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is a challenge to convince law makers that the long-term balance will tip in the favour of 
the country joining the WTO and outweigh the short-term costs24. Parliamentarians tend 
to take short term views given their often limited mandates and change during the (long) 
accession process. Many have little knowledge of the WTO system and rules and regula-
tions, which may mean little to their local constituencies. Indeed, the economic advan-
tages of membership are not immediate and mostly spread over the economy, rather than 
immediate with clear and demonstrable economic effect on the electorate. It thus becomes 
a challenge to convince them of the longer-term advantages of membership and accept 
the short-term costs. This also explains why some accession processes become “dormant”, 
particularly if the domestic constituency is not convinced of the gains25. This was differ-
ent in Kyrgyzstan where the adoption of the negotiating package was smooth and speedy.
The accession process and timely conclusion thus much depends on the prepared-
ness of a country in engaging both domestically and with its trade partners. This requires 
a strong domestic set up to facilitate the many structural domestic legislative reforms to 
be undertaken and conduct consultations at all levels and involving all stakeholders. With 
a view of getting the necessary support in modifying existing and introducing new leg-
islation, one of the first steps in Kyrgyz Republic included the setting up the institutional 
and legislative framework and the inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms to ensure 
coherent approaches. The Ministry of Economy is the central body in the executive given 
authority for the functions of state policy on tariffs, licensing, investment, and foreign 
trade26. It is guided by the Constitution, normative legal acts, international law, and trea-
ties that have entered into force for the Kyrgyz Republic. Several decrees and regulations 
of the Kyrgyz Republic have established an inter-departmental commission on the WTO 
in which various ministries and other state bodies have a role in developing WTO-related 
policy and overseeing obligations The WTO inter-departmental Commission was cre-
ated in 1999 to coordinate WTO multilateral trade issues. It sets out the distribution and 
responsibilities of the ministries and other government bodies with respect to the WTO 
Agreements27. The private sector was also fully associated with the process from the out-
set and the negotiators had regular interactions with the Parliament. The President of the 
Republic took a keen and immediate interest in the WTO accession, thus solidifying the 
political commitment. All issues could be addressed and resolved promptly, which con-
tributed to the adoption of timely decisions and easing the accession.
has often been called upon to speak to parliaments in acceding countries and hold bilateral meetings with 
lawmakers to explain the WTO, including the main elements of the WTO rules-based system and possible 
implications of membership. Personal experience confirms that these meetings often turned out to be deci-
sive in getting the support of Parliament. 
24 It is not easy to measure and quantify in economic terms the benefits that WTO membership brings 
following the accession process, as many of the advantages are gradually obtained during the accession pro-
cess, when the domestic reforms are conducted, and laws are introduced. Contrary to a common belief, little 
immediate change occurs on the day following membership, as most conditions are already met on that day.
25 This was the case with Vanuatu earlier, Algeria, Ethiopia, Lebanon and Sudan; the latter three have 
resumed their accessions.
26 WT/TPR/S/288/Rev.1. 21 January 2014: Kyrgyz Decree of 4 June 2013. No.  312. URL: https://
www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=2ahUKEwjmm-aHsP_lAhVrkI
sKHWz3AtsQFjAAegQIBRAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fdocsonline.wto.org%2Fdol2fe%2FPages%2FFE_
Search%2FExportFile.aspx%3Fid%3D121920%26filename%3Dq%2FWT%2FTPR%2FS288R1.pdf&usg=A
OvVaw2s7UdkpuV31IpHKQ3G6nMC (accessed: 14.07.2019).
27 Kyrgyz Decree of 23 June 2003. No.  374. URL: http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/ 
54515?cl=ru-ru (accessed: 14.07.2019).        
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In addition to preparing and adjusting laws, rules and regulations, the challenges 
included submitting all legal text in official WTO language, sharing information with pri-
vate sector and get their feedback on concessions, identify priorities for give and take and 
establishing red lines, get full support from domestic constituency, including the Parlia-
ment, which needs to be briefed regularly, build technical knowledge and expertise on 
the WTO rules and rights and obligations. The practice shows that WTO Members will 
always ask for the maximum concessions from acceding countries, which need to be clear 
as to how far they can go with granting concessions. In other words, they need to establish 
their “red lines”.
Finally, it should be noted that the accession of the new Members to the WTO 
works both ways. It is beneficial for the acceding country and in return generates eco-
nomic growth and stimulates world trade. Equally important, it strengthens the rule of 
law through multilateral approaches to trade. The reforms undertaken by the Article XII 
members, especially those with large economies like China, have significantly lowered 
protection world-wide and expanded trade opportunities over the past 20 years28. Con-
cerning goods trade, acceding members have made binding commitments on virtually all 
their agricultural and non-agricultural tariffs, significantly improving the certainty and 
predictability of their trade regimes. 
The accession of new members to the WTO has thus been very beneficial economi-
cally and stimulated trade and economic growth world-wide, but equally so from systemic 
perspective. Indeed, the WTO as an institution was genuinely interested to include coun-
tries coming from different economic systems, adding to the diversity of the membership. 
It strongly welcomed and embraced the membership of the formerly centrally planned 
economies that had moved to applying market-based principles. It triggered a process of 
considerable trade liberalization and a wider adherence to the rules-based trading system, 
which was both of economic and systemic significance. This explains why the Secretariat 
organized a WTO Ministerial Conference for Central Asia and Caucasus countries in Tbi-
lisi (May, 2002), in recognition of the considerable reform efforts undertaken by countries 
in the region and a similar Conference was held in Croatia for countries in the Balkan, 
many of whom were negotiating their accession to the WTO following the breaking up of 
former Yugoslavia and the creation of new and independent countries. 
3. Kyrgyzstan’s Economic Performance after WTO Accession
It is an established fact that the Article XII members have economically outper-
formed its trading partners in the world in terms of increase in value of merchandise 
trade29. This also applies to the Kyrgyz Republic, which has experienced a strong eco-
nomic performance since joining the WTO. The economy has undergone a significant 
structural change since its independence in 1991 and strengthened by WTO accession 
in 1998, as confirmed at the two trade policy reviews carried out for the Kyrgyz Republic 
28 Cf WTO at Twenty. Table 5. URL: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201710_e.pdf 
(accessed: 14.07.2019).
29 WT/ACC/31.WT/GC/189.WT/MIN(17)/6. Figures 5,6, 7, p. 33–34, Table 6-1 and 6-2, p. 42. URL: 
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:Tll99FXe9DcJ:https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pag-
es/SS/directdoc.aspx%3Ffilename%3Dq:/WT/ACC/31.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=kg&client=safari 
; WTO at Twenty, challenges and achievements. WTO, Geneva 2015, p.  27. URL: https://www.wto.org/
english/res_e/booksp_e/wto_at_twenty_e.pdf (accessed: 16.08.2019).
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in 2006 and 201330. The structural reforms undertaken allowed Kyrgyz Republic to move 
from a centrally planned economy to integrate into the world economy on the basis of 
market-based principles. Its WTO membership has helped the Kyrgyz Republic stabiliz-
ing and strengthening some of the economic fundamentals, including inflation, budget 
deficits and currency stabilization. 
Based on data from the World Bank, the development of the GDP of the Kyrgyz 
Republic can be illustrated in Figure 1 (a, b). The GDP has risen significantly over the 
past twenty years, except for two years, thus confirming a healthy growth of the economy. 
There was a noticeable decline in GDP in 2000 to the amount of $200 mln, followed by an-
other major decline in 2015–2016 of $800 mln compared to previous years. These declines 
are in part attributed to the effects of a global economic recession, including the Asian and 
Russian crises in 1998. These are often considered one of the most severe economic crises 
in the history of Russia — the main trade and economic partner of the Kyrgyz Republic. 
In addition, the Kyrgyz economy declined due to domestic political instability, a change in 
government and constitutional changes. 
The Kyrgyz Republic’s trade turn-over, including exports and imports evolved rapidly 
and increased 26 times from 60 to 1.6 bln US$. Imports exceeded exports significantly, 
resulting in a rapidly growing trade deficit. Merchandise imports in 2017 (4,5 bln US$) 
are nearly triple merchandise exports (1,8 bln US$). Agriculture represents just over 11 % 
of exports and 13.4 % of imports, manufactures 22.7 % of exports and 69.7 % of imports. 
Exports and imports of fuels and mining products are almost even at around 10 %. Kyrgyz 
Republic is highly dependent on the imports of manufactures and petroleum oils, other 
than crude. The main non-agriculture products exported include gold (20 %), precious 
metal ores and concentrates. Sectors and products that are considered to have an export 
potential for the Kyrgyz Republic include textile-garments, meat, fruit and vegetables, 
milk and dairy products and bottled water, given its unlimited natural fresh water supply. 
The commodity structure of Kyrgyz exports has hardly changed since 2000 and there is 
overall little diversification, which remains one of the key structural reform challenges for 
Kyrgyzstan. It remains strongly dependent on resource-based products generating limited 
skilled employment. 
Trade flows of the Kyrgyz Republic following its WTO accession fluctuated consider-
ably. Following a slowdown, trade expanded very rapidly until 2014 and increased by a 
factor 6, reaching a peak of 7.6 bln US$. It then decreased and somewhat stabilized at a 
lower level. The volume of trade in goods of the Kyrgyz Republic, according to the data of 
the National Statistics Committee, in 2017, amounted to 6.3 bln US$. In absolute num-
bers, between 1998 and 2017, the trade turnover of the Kyrgyz Republic thus effectively 
increased 4.5 times from 1.4 bln US$ to 6.2 bln US$ (сf fig. 2).
The share of trade with the main trading partners of Kyrgyz Republic in the CIS, as 
well as within the economic space of the EAEU remained relatively steady with some ex-
ceptions. Trade with the Russian Federation increased 5 times from 287.8 to 1,456.6 mln 
US$, and with Kazakhstan 5.5  times from 160.7  to 876.7  mln (cf Table 2). As can be 
observed from Table 2, trade turnover grew exponentially fast with China. It is also evi
30 WT/TPR/G/170 (4 September 2006); WT/TPR/S/170 (4 September 2006), /WT/TPR/M/170 (13 
December 2006), WT/TPR7G/288 (1 October 2013); WT/TPR/S/288/Rev.1 (21 January 2014), /WT/
TPR/M/288 (13 January 2014). Official site of Word Trade Organisation. WTO. URL: https://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/countries_e/kyrgyz_republic_e.htm (accessed: 16.08.2019).   
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Fig. 1. Growth of GDP in Kyrgyz Republic since 1998 to 2017
B a s e d  o n: World bank data. URL: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD? 
locations=KG (accessed:06.08.2019); World bank data. URL: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.
PCAP.CD?end=2018&locations=KG&start=1998 (accessed: 06.08.2019).
a) GDP (in bln of US doll.) 
 b) GDP per capita (US doll.) 
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Table 2. The evolution of commodity turnover of the Kyrgyz Republic 
with its main trading partners (in mln of US doll.)
Region 1998 2017 Growth rate
World 1 404,0 6240,00 4,50
Russia 287,80 1456,50 5,06
Kazakhstan 160,80 876,70 5,45
Uzbekistan 160,70 309,90 1,93
Belorussia 14,90 91,80 6,16
China 60,10 1597,60 26,58
USA 48,50 156,30 3,22
Turkey 44,80 356,10 7,95
S o u r c e : National Institute for Strategic Studies of the Kyrgyz 
Republic. URL: http://nisi.kg/112-stati/517-analiz-uchastiya-kyr-
gyzskoj-respubliki-na-platforme-vto.html (accessed: 12.08.2019).
Fig. 2. Dynamics and structure of the trade turnover of the Kyrgyz Republic in the context of the 
EAEU, CIS and WTO countries for 1998–2017 (in mln of US doll.)
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denced in the WTO’s Trade Policy Review reports and confirmed in figures 3 and 4, that 
Kyrgyzstan managed to diversify its trading partners and increase its trading relations with 
WTO members (Cf fig. 3 and 4). It traded goods and services with most WTO members, 
thus benefiting from the new market access conditions offered through WTO Member-
ship. On the export side the main trading partners in 2017 included Switzerland (27.4 %), 
Kazakhstan (16.5 %), Russia (14.7 %), European Union (13.8 %), Uzbekistan (8.2 %), Tur-
key (7.4 %) and China (5.5 %). In terms of imports, the main trading partners were China 
(33.4 %), Russian Federation (26.4 %), Kazakhstan (13.1 %), the European Union (6.7 %), 
Turkey (5 %). This shows that Kyrgyzstan has a major trade deficit with China, the Russian 
Federation and the EU. These figures have remained relatively stable over time with some 
changes since 2006, confirming that the direction s in trade happened early on after the 
accession was completed.
The share of trade with the main trading partners of Kyrgyz Republic in the CIS, as 
well as within the economic space of the EAEU remained relatively steady with some ex-
ceptions. Trade with the Russian Federation increased 5 times from 287.8 to 1,456.6 mln 
US$, and with Kazakhstan 5.5  times from 160.7  to 876.7  mln (Сf Table 2). As can be 
observed from Table 2, trade turnover grew exponentially fast with China. It is also evi-
denced in the WTO’s Trade Policy Review reports and confirmed in figures 3 and 4, that 
Kyrgyzstan managed to diversify its trading partners and increase its trading relations 
with WTO members (cf fig. 3  and 4)31. It traded goods and services with most WTO 
members, thus benefiting from the new market access conditions offered through WTO 
31 Cf WT/TPR/S/288/Rev.1 p. 15 ch.t 1.2 direction of merchandise trade 2006 and 2012 . URL: https://
docsonline.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=121920,1
Fig. 3. Dynamics and structure of exports of the Kyrgyz Republic with EAEU, CIS and WTO in 
1998–2017
S o u r c e: Ministry of Economy. URL: http://mineconom.gov.kg/en (accessed: 20.09.2019).
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Membership. On the export side the main trading partners in 2017  included Switzer-
land (27.4 %), Kazakhstan (16.5 %), Russia (14.7 %), European Union (13.8 %), Uzbekistan 
(8.2 %), Turkey (7.4 %) and China (5.5 %). In terms of imports, the main trading partners 
were China (33.4 %), Russian Federation (26.4 %), Kazakhstan (13.1 %), the European Un-
ion (6.7 %), Turkey (5 %). This shows that Kyrgyzstan has a major trade deficit with China, 
the Russian Federation and the EU. These figures have remained relatively stable over time 
with some changes since 2006, confirming that the direction s in trade happened early on 
after the accession was completed.
The share of exports to CIS countries reached a total of 2.1 bln US$ corresponding 
to less than 50 % of total exports, staying far behind in growth compared to third country 
markets. WTO accession thus implied a rapid diversification of trade and to the benefit of 
WTO members and a relative decrease of the share of CIS in Kyrgyzstan’s trade. 
Imports into the Kyrgyz Republic grew significantly due to low tariffs and MFN trade, 
offering good market access conditions to the Kyrgyz Republic. Among the sectors that 
showed the strongest increase in imports in the Kyrgyz Republic are: medicines, vehicles, 
machinery equipment, finished food products, metal products and textile fabrics. 
The developments on Kyrgyz trade patterns thus show that there has been an expo-
nential high growth in exports and imports since Kyrgyz Republic joined the WTO, but at 
the same time the Kyrgyz Republic has become more dependent on the import of foreign 
19696,82889,71996&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrench
Record=True&HasSpanishRecord=True (accessed: 08.09.2019).
Fig. 4. Dynamics and structure of imports of the Kyrgyz Republic with EAEU, CIS and WTO in 1998–
2017 
S o u r c e: Ministry of Economy. URL: http://mineconom.gov.kg/en (accessed: 20.09.2019).
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manufactures. It also has not been able to diversify the composition of exports and im-
ports. One of several challenges will consist of integrating more fully into world trade by 
better linking to GVC and generating more value addition in the production process and 
upgrading production. Challenges encountered in that regard concern a lack of techno-
logical innovation, areas that have the attention of the authorities. 
4. Regional Integration Challenges for Kyrgyzstan
While the main purpose of WTO membership was to promote multilateral trade 
liberalization and decrease its dependency on regional trading partners, interestingly Kyr-
gyzstan recently has made significant strides (re-)integrating regionally. This is much in 
line with the new trend of regionalism, covering basically all regions, including most of 
the key players and world traders [Acharya, Chauffour, Maur, 2011]. Central Asia is no 
exception with several regional integration initiatives under way. 
From a WTO perspective, one of the concerns with RTAs is that the benefits of trade 
liberalization under RTAs are limited to those parties subscribing to the RTAs and so they 
are exclusive. Hence there is a potential conflict between the two approaches, thus neces-
sitating policy choices. While regionalism is tolerated under the rules of the multilateral 
trading system of the WTO, RTAs deviate from the MFN principles, which ensure that all 
benefits accrue to the entire membership32. In accepting regionalism under WTO rules, 
a fundamental element is that the overall net balance of the regional integration initiative 
should be a positive one, with a net benefit for the world as a whole, an issue that econo-
mists refer to as trade creation versus trade diversion33. In the case of a customs union or 
free trade area, members must remove duties and other restrictions affecting ’substantially 
all trade’ among them34. Other rules require a detailed plan and schedule to show how the 
members will move to free trade, and these are examined to confirm that Article XXIV’s 
requirements have been met. As the GATT provisions on regionalism became largely ob-
solete, the Marrakesh Agreement led to a new Understanding clarifying the procedures to 
be followed and/or touches upon most of the concerns that have come up and making it 
easier to reach agreement on whether regional agreements meet Article XXIV rules35. The 
32 Article XXIV of the GATT (URL: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_02_e.htm ar-
ticleXXIV (accessed: 07.08.2019)) contains specific language detailing the conditions and criteria applying 
to regional integration initiatives, e.g. customs union, free trade arrangements, preferential schemes etc. 
These provided the legal basis for the European Union to establish its customs union in the 1950s and later 
to cover its preferential schemes with its overseas territories. It also became evident that the provisions of 
Article XXIV had some shortcomings, as the question whether the condition in the relevant provisions had 
been met could never be answered. This hampered the discussions and debates for many years, until im-
provements in the provisions were finally adopted, enhancing the transparency principles on regionalism.
33 Regional integration can lead to trade creation by eliminating trade obstacles through tariff reduc-
tion and/or elimination between the constituent parties as well as a reduction of non-tariff measures. It can 
also lead to trade diversion as the conditions provided to the parties of the regional entity are better than 
those provided to the non-parties, thus giving an economic advantage to the region. The difficulty consists 
of making the economic calculations between the trade creation and trade diversion effects and draw con-
clusions on the over all effects. 
34 One of the unresolved questions is what is meant by ‘substantially all trade’ and how to measure 
it? How can the economic effects of the harmonisation technical regulations, standards, laws in the area of 
services and intellectual property rights, agricultural regulations be quantified?
35 GATT 1994: Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994. URL: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/10-24.pdf (accessed: 07.08.2019).
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Agreement also contains provisions on the examination of regional trade agreements, and 
which are mostly procedural. 
Kyrgyzstan is a member of various regional integration initiatives: in 2015, Kyr-
gyzstan joined the EAEU, while in the same year, Kazakhstan completed the process of 
accession to the WTO36. These factors created new conditions in the foreign trade regimes 
of the EAEU with WTO member countries and affected tariff schedules and concessions 
made during the WTO accession. For many items, import duties for both Kyrgyz Republic 
and Kazakhstan were significantly lower than the Common Customs Tariff of the EAEU 
and needed to be raised to comply with the Common External Tariff (CET) of the EAEU. 
Following the accession of the Kyrgyz Republic to the EAEU Treaty of May 29, 2014, 
consultations were held at the WTO on the new trade regime and the implications for 
WTO members. As provided for under the WTO rules, negotiations are carried out by 
Kyrgyzstan in the framework of Articles XXIV and XXVIII of GATT 1994 and in order to 
change the tariff concessions of the Kyrgyz Republic in the WTO. As was observed in Kyr-
gyzstan’s TPR in 2014, the implication of joining the Customs Union meant that the Kyr-
36 Kyrgyzstan’s main regional integration commitments include:
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) — Established in December 1991, the participants include: 
the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Ka-
zakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan, Ukraine (before recent events). The basic document of coopera-
tion among the CIS states was the “Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Zone” of April 15, 1994 
and currently is the “Agreement on the Free Trade Zone”, signed in St. Petersburg on October 18, 2011. 
Based on these agreements, the Kyrgyz Republic provides a free trade regime for all goods originating from 
the CIS countries, while maintaining its own external tariff.
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) — Established in November 1992. The members are the 
Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Republic of Tajikistan, the 
Republic of Turkmenistan, the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The main 
objectives of the organization are the acceleration of regional cooperation in the field of economy, science 
and technology; the development of communication infrastructure both among the ECO member states 
and with other countries.
CAREC Programme: The CAREC programme is in operation since 2001. It is a consultative forum 
initiated by the Asian Development Bank, covering the Republic of Azerbaijan, the PRC, Afghanistan, the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Republic of Tajikistan and 
Mongolia. Basic principles — “Good neighbours, good partners, good prospects” The main activities in 
2010–2020 are the implementation of joint projects aimed to develop transport, trade, trade policy and 
electric power industry. CAREC activities until 2030 involves focusing on five operational clusters: (a) eco-
nomic and financial stability; (b) trade, tourism, and economic corridors; (c) infrastructure and economic 
connectivity; (d) agriculture and water resources; (e) human development. 
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU): The predecessor of the EAEU is the CIS Customs Union, formed 
on January 6, 1995 by Russia and Belarus. Kazakhstan joined it on January 20, 1995, Kyrgyzstan joined on 
March 29, 1996, Tajikistan joined on February 26, 1999. On October 10, 2000, the Customs Union was 
transformed into EurAsEC, and Uzbekistan joined it on January 25, 2006. The formation of the Common 
Economic Space began on January 1, 2012. The process of transforming the CU into the EAEU was complet-
ed by the beginning of 2014. From January 1, 2015, a new integration association, the Eurasian Economic 
Union (EAEU), began to function. Armenia and Kyrgyzstan joined in 2015. The includes free movement of 
goods, a common market for services, with a transitional period until 2025, a common labour market and 
the free movement of capital, with transitional period until 2025.
Kyrgyzstan is a member of several preferential trade agreements with CIS countries and signed FTAs 
with Russia on 8 October 1992, Kazakhstan on 22 June 1995, Uzbekistan on 24 December 1996, Azerbaijan 
on 12 January 2004, Armenia on 7 July 1994, Moldova on 26 May 1995, Ukraine on 26 May 1995, Belarus 
on 30 March 1999, Tajikistan on 19 January 2000. 
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gyz Republic would have to raise its average rate of duty from 5 % to the CET of 10.5 %37. 
This is quite problematic and requires substantial renegotiation of tariff concessions. Re-
ferring to a study undertaken by the Eurasian Development Bank38, it is noted that:
 • 30 % of Kyrgyz duties align with those of the customs union, and thus would not 
need to be changed;
 • 21 % can be re-aligned with those of the customs union without violating WTO 
commitments, but
 • Nearly 50 % do not align and would require re-negotiations and compensation to 
WTO Members.
Interest in conducting negotiations with the Kyrgyz Republic was expressed by seven 
WTO member countries (hereinafter referred to as the Participants of the negotiations), 
which account for more than a third of world exports. The Government of the Kyrgyz Re-
public submitted the required notifications to the WTO on the entire spectrum of issues 
that are subject to changes in the foreign trade regime of the Kyrgyz Republic, following its 
accession to the EAEU. The main objective is to ensure that all measures taken at the level 
of the EAEU are brought in conformity with the WTO. 
The question then is, looking at the evolution of its trade patterns from an economic 
perspective, with most significant trade growth occurring with WTO Members and not 
its regional trade partners, why Kyrgyzstan puts itself in a situation requiring a significant 
increase in its tariffs and the explicit obligation of renegotiating its commitments and 
providing compensation. The process risks to be long, cumbersome and very expensive 
for Kyrgyzstan and its trading partners. It is understood that not all compensation needs 
to be provided by Kyrgyzstan, as long as the overall balance of trade concessions can be 
maintained, but someone will have to pay the bill. Given that the renegotiations concern 
the EAEU Members in terms of compensation to be provided, the negotiation process is 
carried out in close coordination with the EAEU member countries in order to determine 
the levels of compensation. The process of renegotiating tariff concessions is likely to be 
long, complex and costly.
5. The Way Forward 
In pursuing its key objectives and as a new and Recently Acceded Member (RAM) 
of the WTO, the main challenges for the Kyrgyz Republic consists of continuing the re-
form process initiated during and following its accession process39. The domestic reform 
agenda is particularly challenging at a time of globalization and the need to be inserted in 
Global Value Chains [Smeets, Mashayekhi, 2019; Smeets, 2017]. Putting the right policies 
in place and having an economy that can be reactive and responsive to rapidly changing 
economic conditions is not an easy task. It includes a broad range of measures aimed at re-
37 WT/TPR/S/288/Rev.1, p. 23. URL: https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.as
px?language=E&CatalogueIdList=120527,118699&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextHash (accessed: 
08.08.2019).
38 Eurasian Development Bank (2012); USAID/The services Group/AECOM (2010a) and (2010b). 
39 The countries that are recognized as Recently Acceded Members (RAMs) are defined in the WTO 
negotiations and listed as such for the purpose of having a common understanding on which ones they are. 
Given their status as having recently acceded and having made considerable concessions in the process, 
special conditions are considered for them under the terms of the draft agreements under negotiation.
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ducing transaction costs, easing business transactions, reviewing tax laws and regulations 
and enhancing transparency with a view attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). All 
measures are geared towards enhancing competition, encouraging and facilitating trade, 
easing customs procedures, lowering import duties and reducing the incidence of non-
tariff measures. The key challenge is to ensure that all benefit from the liberalization. 
Given its transition from a centrally planned system to a market-based economy, a 
fundamental policy shift included reducing state control over strategically important sec-
tors, which for many years generated government revenue as well as the control it could 
exercise over its operations in industries, such as mining, energy and many other key ar-
eas. Privatization was key to success. Other major challenges included the elimination of 
non-tariff measures, quantitative restrictions, adjusting its customs valuation methodolo-
gy for the importation of goods and bring it in line with the customs valuation agreement, 
reviewing its licensing systems (automatic licensing), adopting standards and regulations 
in line with international technical and sanitary and phytosanitary standards, which can 
be complex, costly and difficult to implement. While many actions were taken in that 
sense, other policy options still need to be pursued for a further and deeper integration in 
the trading system.
The implementation of the WTO agreements is not only technically challenging, but 
requires further institutional and regulatory reforms, which can be complex and costly. 
Calculations made by the World Bank show that the implementation of the Customs Valu-
ation Agreement, including the institutional reforms of the customs and its modernization 
can cost well beyond $100 mln [Finger, Schuler, 1998]. Separately, membership required 
legislation for intellectual property rights, another major challenging area, eliminating 
trade related investment measures (TRIMS), which are in conflict with WTO etc. This 
again is to show that the reform process is still on in critical sectors of the economy.
5.1. The Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA)
Bearing the above-mentioned objectives in mind, and after a careful examination of 
all aspects of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), the Kyrgyz Republic decided to ful-
ly support and ratify the Agreement, which happened on 6th December 2016. It is recalled 
that the TFA was negotiated at the MC-IX (Bali) WTO and adopted by the members on 
27 November 201440. The TFA could only enter into force once two-thirds of members 
had completed their domestic ratification process. On 22nd February 2017, the required 
total of 111 members had ratified the agreement, thus freeing the way to its entering into 
force and implementation41. To date a total of 145 members have ratified42. In ratifying 
the TFA, nearly two years after the TFA was negotiated, Kyrgyz Republic showed a strong 
political will and commitment to be bound by provisions of this Agreement. It is strongly 
motivated by the economic efficiency gains that can be derived from a full implementation 
40 Agreement on Trade Facilitation. 11 December 2013. WT/MIN (13)/36, WT/L/911. URL: https://
webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:mMq_pDAwUW4J:https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/
SS/directdoc.aspx%3Ffilename%3Dq:/WT/MIN13/36.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=kg&client=safari 
(accessed: 12.08.2019).
41 Cf WTO 2017 News item. 22 February 2017: WTO’s Trade facilitation Agreement enters into force. 
URL: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/fac_31jan17_e.htm (accessed: 12.08.2019).
42 TFA Data base of the WTO. URL: https://www.tfadatabase.org (accessed: 12.08.2019).    
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of the TFA. The Ministry of Economy introduced the Single Window and initiated new, 
streamlined administrative customs procedures, aiming at an information system based 
on paperless trade. In undertaking these changes and improvements in customs proce-
dures it benefited from substantial technical support provided by the World Customs Or-
ganization and the Asian Development Bank.
Indeed, there has been a large conversion of thought in the literature on the eco-
nomic benefits that the implementation of the TFA can yield [WTO World Trade Report 
2015…]. A recent study undertaken jointly by the WTO and the World Bank underscores 
the role of reducing transaction costs in developing countries in support of trade [World 
Bank Group…, 2015]. It observes that it is “a common finding in the literature that trade 
facilitation can improve export performance and that the potential gains are larger for 
developing countries that developed countries”43. The WTO estimates that “the full im-
plementation of TFA could reduce global trade costs by an average of 14.3 per cent”44. 
According to the Peterson Institute, “the implementation of the TFA could amount to 
over US$ 1  trillion in gains to the world GDP” [Hufbauer, Schott 2013]. There is wide 
recognition of the fact that while the implementation of the TFA will benefit all countries, 
it will mostly come to the benefit of developing countries, as both export and GDP growth 
will increase more than in developed countries. Beverelli calculates that “improved trade 
facilitation can lead to an increase in the number of products exported by destination of 
up to 16 per cent” [Beverelli, Neumuller, Teh, 2015]. Similar conclusions on the gains of 
the TFA are contained in a series of case studies presented by WTO Chairs, in which they 
analyze the cost and benefits of the implementation of the TFA for countries and regions 
and more specifically for Africa and Arab countries [Teh et al., 2016]. Calculations made 
by economists, international organizations and think tanks suggest that the trade costs in 
developing countries are on average the equivalent of 219  % import duties45. Hence the 
literature provides the supporting evidence justifying the determination of the Kyrgyz 
Republic to upscale and modernize its customs procedures. The expected gains from the 
TFA for Kyrgyzstan have not yet been quantified, but merit further consideration.
5.2. Information Technology Agreement (ITA)
The Kyrgyz Republic became a Participant to the Information Technology Agreement 
(ITA). It is recalled that the first ITA was agreed by the WTO members during the first 
Ministerial Conference, MC-I (Singapore)46. The ITA includes 82 WTO members, who 
collectively account for 97 % of world trade in IT goods47. It is a typical example of a secto-
rial initiative aimed at liberalizing trade in a specific area and providing new market access 
opportunities. It is noteworthy that the ITA members inscribe the tariff concessions, that 
43 World Bank Group and the World Trade Organization (2015). The Role of Trade in Ending Poverty. 
Joint publication. URL: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/worldbankandwto15_e.pdf (accessed: 
20.08.2019).
44 Cf WTO World Trade Report 2015. Ch. D, p. 73. 
45 Ibid, Foreword by the Director General.
46 As contained in the Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products. 13 De-
cember 1996. URL: https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&Catalo
gueIdList=15259,1447,59473,31385,38875,31396,20233,3979,15215,38784&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=8&
FullTextHash (accessed: 23.08.2019). 
47 Data as of August 2019.
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is, elimination of duties in their tariff schedules, which de facto implements the ITA on a 
MFN basis. In other words, all the benefits of the ITA are automatically extended to the 
entire WTO membership by virtue of the MFN principle. Ministers endorsed the results 
of the negotiations at MC-X (Nairobi) and in accordance with the Ministerial Declaration, 
the first set of tariff cuts were implemented in July 2016, with a second tranche of cuts to 
be implemented in 201748. As a member to the ITA the Kyrgyz Republic should make ef-
forts to take full advantage that the membership offers.
5.3. Government Procurement
The Kyrgyz Republic has been an observer to the Government Procurement Agree-
ment (GPA) for the past 20 years and continues assessing the prospects of joining the 
agreement. In joining the GPA, the Kyrgyz Republic has the prospect of stimulating more 
domestic competition in the process of procuring goods and services, allowing govern-
ment entities to be listed under the terms of the GPA to purchase these goods and services 
at competitive market prices, thus generating public cost-savings. According to various 
studies, the government procurement market represents 15–20 % of the world economy 
and it is an increasingly strategic focus for governments [Anderson, Arrowsmith, 2011; 
The WTO at Twenty…, 2015]. The GPA was revised recently and it is estimated that the 
parties to the revised GPA will see gains in market access of some US$ 80 bln to US$ 
100 bln annually for their businesses49. These gains in market access are expected to be 
obtained as a result of adding a large number of government entities (ministries and agen-
cies) to the scope of the GPA and from new services and other areas of public procure-
ment activities being included in its expanded coverage. 
It is believed that inter alia, GPA membership will reduce the risk of corruption, of-
ten associated with government procurement. Accession to the GPA will imply a change 
in current procedures, ensure transparency and a transition to international standards. 
The market of Kyrgyz government purchases is relatively small with an estimated value 
of around 300–500 million US dollars. The threshold for tendering under the GPA is 
between 130–400  US dollars depending on the purchase and for construction works 
it is 5 million US dollars. Thus, Kyrgyzstan, when joining the GPA is expected to save 
on the large contracts and likely to retain a leverage for the lion share of the purchases 
which remain below the threshold. Given that two of Kyrgyz main partners, Russia and 
Kazakhstan, are actively engaged in negotiations on their accession to the GPA, and 
Armenia has been a member of the GPA since 2015, the Kyrgyz Republic cannot stay 
behind. The EBRD is supporting Kyrgyzstan’s negotiation process through the legal and 
technical assistance to the negotiation team. The current status of the negotiations was 
signalled at the GPA committee in 2018 with most bilateral negotiation with other GPA 
members completed.
48 Cf Ministerial Declaration on the Expansion of Trade in Information Technology products. 16 De-
cember 2015. MC-X (Nairobi). 
49 As contained in WTO News items of 7 April 2014. URL: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/
news14_e/gpro_07apr14_e.htm (accessed: 23.08. 2019).
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5.4. Promoting Services Trade in Support 
of Kyrgyzstan’s Economic Development
As part of the Kyrgyz Republic’s National Sustainable Development Strategy pursued 
between 2013–2017, the government decided to accord specific attention to promoting 
the export of services, which in 2012 represented a share of 46.6 % of GDP, compared to 
only 40 % in 200650. This is well below the average with most developed countries having a 
share of 60–65 % of GDP and shows that there is a significant potential to develop [Mash-
ayekhi, Antunes, 2017] and further carefully liberalize the services sectors in the Kyrgyz 
Republic. It also means that the potential has largely remained untapped, since Kyrgyzstan 
had made a total number of services commitments in 135 (sub)sectors and which is the 
third highest number of commitments to date51. 
Services trade offers a great development perspective and a valuable alternative and/
or complement to the industrial development [Mashayekhi, 2000]. “The key concern for 
developing countries is not only whether the flow of trade is maximized but also develop-
ment aspects of such trade, including its contribution to building a competitive services 
sector and maximization of overall level of development”. She then explains that “it is 
now widely recognized that carefully designed and prepared liberalization can contribute 
to improve the economic performance of developing countries through their integration 
in the world economy. This improved performance is, among other things, the result of 
increased competition and opportunities for developing countries exports and accompa-
nying transfer of skills, information and technology. However, for a broader development, 
social and equity objectives to be achieved in developing countries, it is important that 
trade liberalization is coordinated with policies to promote domestic supply capacity and 
related regulatory and institutional reform” [Mashayekhi, Olarreaga, Pinto, 2011].
In accordance with the commitments made in services, the Kyrgyz Republic grants 
MFN treatment for most services activities to WTO Members, except where it has made 
exemptions to MFN in accordance with GATS and as inscribed in the commitments. At 
the same time, it benefits from MFN treatment abroad, thus allowing its services exports 
to grow. Since its accession to the WTO, Kyrgyzstan has made significant strides opening 
its market for important service operators in critical sectors of the economy, including 
banking, insurance, telecommunications etc. By way of illustration, at the time of its ac-
cession, there were significant restrictions for foreign banks operations in the Kyrgyz Re-
public, which were lifted in 2002. The same applies to insurance services, which included 
significant restrictions on the participation of foreign insurance companies until 2002. 
The most important services sectors of Kyrgyzstan are wholesale and retail trade ser-
vices, transportation, tourism and business services [Mashayekhi, 2000]52. Other types of 
services have a small share (from 0.1 % to 8 %). The share of tourism services has tended to 
grow both in total exports and imports over the period 2006–2012. Meanwhile, the share 
of transportation services has gone down over the same period. Kyrgyzstan being a land-
50 WT/TPR/G/288, p.  5. URL: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/g288_e.pdf  (accessed: 
30.08.2019).
51 As was observed earlier, most if not all Article XII members have taken higher levels of commit-
ments than other WTO members.
52 WT/TPR/G/288, p.  8. URL: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/g288_e.pdf (accessed: 
24.08.2019).
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locked country and at cross-roads between East and West including some major trading 
nations, much depends on a good infra-structure, including road and air transportation. 
This means that more efforts will need to be undertaken in this sector and for which the 
implementation of the TFA will be of critical importance. Also, most (i.e. over 50 %) of its 
services trade takes place within CIS countries, testifying of the economic significance of 
this region for services trade. This stands in contrast with goods trade, with the main trad-
ing partners being other than CIS countries. Here again there is scope for diversification.
In the long-term, the expectation is that the services sector will have the largest im-
pact among the real sectors of economy, which form the GDP. This sector will develop 
faster in comparison with other economy sectors of the country. Hence the priority that 
is accorded to services trade and implementing legislation that is likely to be conducive to 
attract more FDI in such sectors as banking, telecommunications, postal services, trans-
port, tourism etc. 
To attract more FDI in the services sectors, the Kyrgyz Republic is committed to 
pursuing its liberalization efforts for postal, tele-communication services, air transport 
services, lawyer services and energy distribution. Also, given the rapidly splitting up of 
production processes and rising trade in parts and components, as well as growing inter-
action between goods and services, with a steadily rising share of services incorporated in 
goods, the Kyrgyz Republic would stand to gain from a fuller participation in the global 
value chains. Given the limitations of its small domestic market for production and con-
sumption, being part of the EAEU offers new opportunities to generate economies of scale 
for goods and services. 
5.5. Technical Barriers to Trade and Sanitary and Phyto Sanitary Measures 
(TBT and SPS)
Technical regulations, standards and sanitary and phyto-sanitary regulations are ar-
eas that are of significant interest to Kyrgyz Republic given the potential for further de-
veloping and expanding trade and meeting the relevant standards and SPS conditions in 
the export markets. It is also recognized that in doing so, a deepening of the expertise of 
Kyrgyz officials is required. The reality however is that the technical requirements are sub-
ject to frequent change and the Kyrgyz Republic does not have an inquiry point for SPS 
measures. During the Trade Policy Review conducted for Kyrgyz Republic in 2014, WTO 
Members observed that further efforts were required on the side of the Kyrgyz Republic 
to ensure that its regulatory system would be implemented according to WTO obligations 
in the SPS Agreement, which calls on WTO Members to base their regulations on inter-
national standards and science53. 
It requires establishing enquiry points, which allow foreign operators to get informa-
tion on those very same standards and regulations introduced. The structural adjustments 
required thus go far beyond the introduction of new laws and regulations, but it involves 
the setting up of physical and technical infra-structures, requiring considerably invest-
ment in equipment and technologies, as well as in training and skill development for the 
53 WT/TPR/S/328 para 20. URL: https://docsonline.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=227590,135736,66726,105138&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=1&F
ullTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True (accessed: 
04.09.2019).
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operators of the standard bodies. It requires staff and training, which takes both time and 
money. According to Finger and Schuler the implementation of the agreements relating to 
TBT, SPS and intellectual property can cost over $130 mln [Finger, Schuler, 1998]. This is 
an area where the Kyrgyz Republic continues to face challenges. 
5.6. Promoting Foreign Direct Investment
The Kyrgyz Republic attracts relatively little FDI, which led the government to take 
various economic reforms with a view to ensuring a strong legal system to protect investor 
rights and apply the national treatment to all investors. The government of Kyrgyz Re-
public has made it a priority to further improve the investment climate and strengthening 
investor confidence to attract foreign direct investment and boost economic growth. As is 
observed in the TPR54, the overall investment trends demonstrate an uneven inflow of for-
eign investments to Kyrgyzstan. Foreign investments for the years 2006–12 have increased 
by 1.7 times, with 12.1 % average annual growth rate (from USD2,514.4 to 4,335.8 mln). 
The inflow of Foreign Direct Investments has uneven trends, which were within the range 
of 9–17 % of the GDP. The value of this index is below the threshold value of indicator of 
FDI sufficiency that makes 25 % of GDP according to international practice. FDI inflow 
over the last years has been mostly from non-CIS countries and mainly from Canada and 
China, accounting for nearly 34 % of all FDI. To this should be added nearly 19 % of FDI 
originating from the EU. The CIS share in FDI is less than 29 %, of which Kazakhstan 
alone takes a share of 22.5 %. Canada mainly invests in the mining industry, and China 
in both large-scale investments projects and in small and medium sized enterprises. The 
processing industry, which accounts for the largest part of Foreign Direct Investments, 
continues to be the most attractive sector for foreign investors in Kyrgyzstan. This again 
points to the importance of one segment in the economy that is predominant and gen-
erates government revenue, but accounts for a small share of employment and doesn’t 
generate much value addition. Policies should thus be geared towards other sectors that 
would ease inclusive growth, including in services and other value adding process.
5.7. Enhancing Transparency through Notifications 
Data contained in the WTO Secretariat reports on notifications55 that are circulated 
to Members and the relevant tables contained in the documents on Members’ notifica-
tions in specific fields show that the Kyrgyz Republic stays behind in meeting its notifica-
tion obligations. While this is a tedious and elaborate job, it is nevertheless essential in 
enhancing transparency in policy making. To assist WTO Members and facilitate the pro-
cess of making notifications, the WTO Secretariat has prepared a handbook on notifica-
54 WT/TPR/G 288, p.  9. URL: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&
cd=2&ved=2ahUKEwjXmKrCyv_lAhXFhqQKHdsBDYgQFjABegQIARAB&url=https%3A%2F%2Fdo
cs.wto.org%2Fdol2fe%2FPages%2FFE_Search%2FDDFDocuments%2F119697%2Fq%2FWT%2FTPR%2
FG288.pdf&usg=AOvVaw3y9ZC6VqyOmqIoyuJLrJ53 (accessed: 04.09.2019).
55 G/L/223/Rev.26. URL: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&
cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjEzZSEz__lAhXlo4sKHSH3CiEQFjAAegQIBhAC&url=https%3A%2F%
2Fdocs.wto.org%2Fdol2fe%2FPages%2FSS%2Fdirectdoc.aspx%3Ffilename%3Dq%3A%2FG%2FL%2F22
3R26.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2wYb6UID_T12NK3YjU0T3q (accessed: 07.09.2019).
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tions, accessible to all Members. It offers training programs on notifications and under the 
internship programs offered by the WTO and of which Kyrgyz Republic had benefited, the 
secretariat offers direct support to beneficiaries in discharging their notification require-
ments. Hence, this is an area where more efforts should be pursued.
On the positive side, and regarding agriculture, the Kyrgyz Republic has notified that 
it provided no export subsidies to agricultural products. This is in line with its accession 
commitments, where it agreed not to apply export subsidies. It is recalled that at MC-X 
(Nairobi) a decision was taken to fully eliminate and prohibit export subsidies by devel-
oped countries with immediate effect, followed by the elimination of export subsidies by 
developing countries by the end of 201856.
5.8. The Role of Institutional and Human Trade Capacity Building
Given the highly complex nature of the WTO agreements and the technical expertise 
required to understand and implement the agreements, trade capacity building was an 
essential component in the reform process. This was one of the conclusions of the two 
Ministerial meetings that the then Director-General organized for the CIS and the Bal-
kan countries: the efforts undertaken by countries in these two regions were significant 
precisely because of the scale of reforms required to conform to the WTO’s market-based 
principles [Smeets, 2013]. The human and institutional capacity required was provided 
by the WTO Secretariat, bilateral donors and other international organizations, including 
USAID, SECO, EBRD, UNDP, World Bank and CTPL [Smeets, 2013]. 
Officials from the Kyrgyz Republic have been associated with over 600 TA activities 
since they joined the WTO. The activities included training courses, general and special-
ized technical seminars and courses to enhance their knowledge, awareness and under-
standing of the agreements and obligations. In addition, a WTO reference centre was 
established in support of the government, academic and business society. Many training 
events took place in-country (Bishkek) for government officials, including general and 
specialized WTO training sessions. 
The Kyrgyz Republic has also benefited from the WTO’s internship programs, includ-
ing a dozen officials that have been trained under the Netherlands Trainee Program and 
the French Irish Mission Internship Program. In Fall 2018, an academic event was held in 
the Kyrgyz Republic, with lectures and seminars offered by the authors to students at vari-
ous universities. Discussions were also held with professors and academics on research to 
be undertaken on the WTO and more specifically on trade related issues of particularly 
interest to the Kyrgyz Republic and with a view of assisting policymakers in their policy 
decisions. The rationale is to more closely involve the academia in policy making deci-
sions. This is an area that can be strengthened further.
56 Ministerial Declaration WT/MIN(15)45-WT/L/980, para.7. URL: https://www.google.com/url?sa
=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=2ahUKEwjps-ip0v_lAhXr-SoKHZseA4QQFjAAegQIBh
AC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fdocs.wto.org%2Fdol2fe%2FPages%2FSS%2Fdirectdoc.aspx%3Ffilename%3D
q%3A%2FWT%2FMIN15%2F45.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2AbZL-hGMJzy9r4K_6HsRN (accessed: 09.09.2019).
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Conclusions
This paper started with the hypothesis that policy reforms are a necessary condi-
tion for a country’s fuller integration into the WTO multilateral trading system and 
achieving economic benefits. The paper evidences that the policy directions chosen by 
the government of Kyrgyz Republic since its accession to the WTO twenty years ago are 
clear: in addition to the fundamental economic and policy reforms, significant liberali-
zation in goods and services, very low tariffs and a significant number of services com-
mitments, there is strong commitment to reforms and abiding by the rules of the WTO 
multilateral trading system. It was argued that Kyrgyzstan’s policies are geared towards 
applying market based principles, creating and enhancing a competitive trading envi-
ronment, reducing obstacles to trade, applying international standards, simplifying and 
streamlining customs procedures, taking advantage of the potential benefits generated 
by the application of the TFA, promoting FDI, innovation and transfer of technology, 
diversifying production and exports, generating more value added, being more closely 
linked to GVCs and developing and strengthening further the services economy, in-
cluding in the tourism sector. This is full agenda and shows that reforms are part of an 
on-going process.
It was demonstrated that during its twenty years of WTO membership, the Kyrgyz 
Republic has conducted major structural reforms in order to achieve its key objectives, 
i.e. the integration into the world economy, including the implementation of WTO mem-
bership obligations. It has diversified its trade relations with a broader range of WTO 
Members, while at the same time deepening its relations with countries in the region, 
by joining regional integration initiatives, including the customs union of the EAEU. It 
was also shown that many of its objectives continue to be work in progress. Some of the 
objectives can be achieved through internal, i.e. domestic efforts, such as abiding by the 
rules, liberalization and enhancing transparency, others depend on outside factors, some 
of which are beyond its control. The Kyrgyz Republic is an active Member in the WTO, 
committed to making substantive inputs in the deliberations and negotiations in pursuit 
of its economic and trade interests. 
In conclusion, this paper evidences once again that domestic reforms are a sine 
qua non for generating economic growth. It requires a strong political commitment, 
determination, a longer-term vision, strategy, a clear understanding of the country’s 
economic potential and the political will to implement the reforms. Even then when all 
ingredients are in place, a full integration into the multilateral trading system remains 
a challenge.
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Для цитирования: Smeets M., Djumaliev M. (2019) Kyrgyz Republic and Structural Reforms: Twen-
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Кыргызская Республика вступила в  ВТО двадцать лет назад с  надеждой на то, что 
структурные реформы, которые будут проведены для получения членства, и приме-
нение торговых правил станут способствовать ее преобразованию из централизован-
но планируемой экономики в рыночную и облегчат ее интеграцию в многостороннюю 
торговлю ВТО. Процесс присоединения завершился в рекордно короткие сроки, эко-
номика была значительно либерилизована, тарифы существенно снижены, появились 
серьезные обязательства в широком спектре сектора услуг. Кыргызстан принял зако-
нодательство во всех областях, необходимых для членства в ВТО, и создал конкурент-
ные условия доступа на рынки товаров и услуг. Оглядываясь назад на два десятиле-
тия членства в ВТО, мы видим, что процесс реформ окупается. Торговля значительно 
расширилась, появились новые рынки для импорта и экспорта, что уменьшило ее за-
висимость от традиционных торговых партнеров, и  экономика росла очень быстро. 
В то же время остается много проблем для дальнейшей диверсификации экономики, 
более эффективного использования возможностей, предлагаемых в торговле услугами, 
привлечения прямых иностранных инвестиций и полной реализации всех связанных 
с ВТО законов, норм и правил. Следовательно, процесс реформ по-прежнему имеет су-
щественное значение в экономической политике Кыргызстана для углубления и укре-
пления его интеграции в мировую торговую систему.
Ключевые слова: торговая политика, переговоры, структурные преобразования, пост-
вступление, политическая согласованность.
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